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Is There Less 
Bullshit in For 
Marx then in 
Reading Capital?
William Lewis
Abstract:
 This paper explores G. A. Cohen’s claim that Althusser’s Marxist philoso-
phy is bullshit. This exploration is important because, if we are persuaded 
by Cohen’s assertion that there are only three types of Marxism: ana-
lytic, pre-analytic, and bullshit and, further, that only analytic Marxism is 
concerned with truth and therefore “uniquely legitimate” then, as political 
philosophers interested in Marxism’s potential philosophical resources, 
we may wish to privilege its analytic form. However, if Cohen’s attribution 
is misplaced, then we may wish to explore why Cohen was so insistent 
in this ascription and what this insistence reveals about his own politi-
cal philosophy. The first half of this paper explains what Cohen means by 
bullshit and it examines the distinction between bullshit and non-bullshit 
Marxism. The second half explores what the insistent misattribution of 
the epithet “bullshit Marxism” to Althusser’s Marxism reveals about Co-
hen’s own Marxist political philosophy. 
Keywords:
Althusser, G. A. Cohen, bullshit, Marxism, analytic, political, philosophy
This paper explores G. A. Cohen’s 1978 claim in the introduction to 
Karl Marx’s Theory of History [KMTH] that there is more bullshit in Al-
thusser’s contribution to Reading Capital [RC] than there is in the essays 
comprising For Marx [FM].1 This exploration is important because, if we 
are persuaded by Cohen’s claim that there are only three types of Marx-
ism: analytic, pre-analytic, and bullshit and, further, that only analytic 
Marxism is concerned with truth and therefore “uniquely legitimate” then, 
as Marxist philosophers interested in Althusser’s classic work between 
1960-1965, we may wish to privilege FM over RC. 2 This is the case as the 
former may already be analytic or amenable to analytic correction to an 
extent that the latter, due to its bullshit quotient, is not. 
In order to pursue this investigation and to better understand why 
Cohen identified at least some portion of Althusser’s work as bullshit , 
we will first examine the scattered references to Althusser and “Althus-
serians” that appear throughout Cohen’s writings.3 Second, we will give 
1  Cohen, 2000b, p. x. Cohen calls Lire le capital “critically vague,” a description that marks the 
work as bullshit according to at least one of the criteria that Cohen develops.
2  Cohen, 2000a, pp. xxv–xvi, 2013a, p. 123,
3  Though there are considerable theoretical difference between Althusser and those who 
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an account of what Cohen means when he labels a philosophical argu-
ment “bullshit.” Third, we will apply Cohen’s criteria for bullshit to FM and 
Althusser’s contributions to RC to see whether his assertion that FM has 
more bullshit than RC is true. This done, we should then be in a position 
to decide whether to privilege FM over RC because of its closer potential 
or actual connection to the truth. 
Cohen on Althusser
 Like the British historian Tony Judt, Cohen found many opportuni-
ties throughout his career to criticize the work of Louis Althusser and of 
“Althusserians.” 4 It is also clear that, for both the intellectual historian 
and the political philosopher, there was something in Althusser’s phi-
losophy (and perhaps the attention paid to it) that was unsupportable and 
which both scholars thought must repeatedly be exposed and decried. 
While Judt was content to repeatedly invoke the caricature of Althusser 
and Althusserianism first sketched in his book Marxism and the French 
Left, for Cohen, this founding took the dual form of an autobiographical 
and a philosophical break.5 
 In the autobiographical version of this break, Cohen tells a tale of 
attraction to Althusserian ideas and recounts his reading of Pour Marx 
and Lire le Capital in their original French editions in 1968.6 Like the revolu-
tions of that spring, however, this “intoxication” with Althusserian ideas 
was not to last. The first event that Cohen gives as explanation for this 
falling out was his realization that the “reiterated affirmation of the value 
of conceptual rigour was not matched by conceptual rigour in [Althus-
serian] intellectual practice.”7 The second experience was an encounter 
with a “tough American philosopher” who challenged Cohen to explain 
exactly what he meant when he said that, “in Marx’s view, the rich capital-
ist’s mistress does not love him because of his money: instead she loves 
the money itself.” This philosopher wanted Cohen to explain exactly what 
call themselves Althusserians, we will stick with the rough grained category suggested by Cohen’s 
usage where the category “Althusserian” includes the theoretical writings of Althusser and anyone 
whose Marxism Althusser’s reading of Marx has profoundly influenced. 
4  Montag, 2013, p. 11.
5  Judt, 1986, pp. 221–233; Riley, 2011.
6  Cohen, 2000b, p. xxi.
7  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxi.
he intended to convey with this phrase and “how one was supposed to go 
about telling whether or not it was true.” 8 The demand was followed by an 
admonition to always cover the “ground rules” in a philosophical argu-
ment, a reproach that Cohen testifies “hit me hard and sunk in deep.” The 
internalization of this admonition had the effect of discouraging Cohen 
thenceforth from “writing…in the fashion of a poet who puts down what 
sounds good to him and who needn’t defend his lines.” From then on, Co-
hen shares that he challenged himself to ask of each sentence “precisely 
what this sentence contributes to the developing exposition or argument” 
and he reasoned that it is only “when you practice that sort of…self-criti-
cism” that you become analytical.” 9
 Like many an autobiographical account, this narrative of enchant-
ment, disenchantment, and growth is a bit too tidy. 10 And, though it tells 
us something about Cohen’s psychological motivation for contrasting 
his Marxism to that of Althusser, it is a bit vague on specific criticisms of 
Althusser’s work. Unfortunately, such criticisms were never made. What 
we do have, however, are Cohen’s broad characterizations of Althusser’s 
ideas and methodology as wells as concise judgments about the value of 
some of these ideas and about some of his specific works. In the following 
paragraphs, we will make use of these remarks to detail the reasons given 
for the philosophical break with Althusserianism.
 Famously, Cohen wrote in the foreword to KMTH that he was 
inspired by Althusser’s Pour Marx, which “persuaded [him] that the abid-
ingly important Marx is to be found in Capital and the writings prepara-
tory to it.”11 We also have approbatory remarks from Cohen in the 2002’s 
“Complete Bullshit” essay about the “Althusserian school” champion-
ing the idea of a “conceptually rigorous” Marxism.12 This is the extent of 
explicitly positive remarks by Cohen on Althusser and Althusserianism. 
From the generous remark about FM convincing him of Capital’s primacy 
in the foreword to KMTH, Cohen proceeds to a disparaging assess-
ment of Althusser’s RC as “critically vague” and as an example of “how 
8  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxii.
9  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxii.
10  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxii) The encounter with the “tough American philosopher” happened prior 
to the 1968 publication of (Cohen, 1968) and also prior to Cohen’s reading of FM and RC. 
11  Cohen, 2000b, p. x.
12  Cohen, 2013a, p. 112.
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elegantly-and evasively-the French language could be used.”13 Cohen also 
makes a first attempt at a sociology of the profession in this introductory 
section when he attributes this vagueness to the fact that “logical posi-
tivism, with its insistence on precision of intellectual commitment, never 
caught on in Paris.”14
 From general comments about the lack of lucidity of RC and spec-
ulations about the reasons for this obscurity, Cohen passes on in KMTH’s 
foreword to a brief discussion of the “doctrinal differences” between 
Althusserian Marxism and his own. Though brief, the statement reveals 
something about how Cohen saw the Althusserian project and why he 
rejected it. The discussion is also useful because, from this point on in his 
career, Cohen writes little about how his Marxism varies from Althusser’s 
and mostly attacks “Althusserians” for their lack of methodological rigor 
and clarity. Quantitatively, Cohen judges that the difference between his 
Marxism and that of the Althusserians is “considerable.” Rather than list 
all the differences, he chooses to state what his Marxism emphasizes: 
this is “an old-fashioned historical materialism, a traditional conception, 
in which history is, fundamentally, the growth of human productive power, 
and forms of society rise and fall according as they enable or impede 
that growth.” Cohen adds one more hint of what differentiates him from 
Althusser when he relates that his Marxism does not emphasize “class 
conflict, ideology, and the state.”15 
 Between the 1978 foreword to KMTH and the new introduction to 
the 2000 re-edition of the volume, Cohen’s references to Althusser are 
scattered. They also lack details as well as supporting arguments and 
references. For instance, in a footnote from Chapter VII of KMTH, Cohen 
paraphrases an Althusserian argument, signals his assent to its prem-
ises and then declares that the premises do not support the conclusion.16 
Later, in the same volume, he references Althusser’s concept of “struc-
tural causality” as a failed attempt at finding an alternative to functional 
explanations for socio-economic change. The footnote to this reference 
then charges Althusser with hypocrisy for employing functional explana-
tion in his account of ideology.17 Surprisingly, in a set of lecture notes on 
13  Cohen, 2000b, p. x.
14  Cohen, 2000b, p. x. 
15  Cohen, 2000b, p. x.
16  Cohen, 2000b, pp. 176–77fn.
17  Cohen, 2000b, pp. 279–80.
Hobbes from 1988-89, Cohen makes explicit and apparently favorable ref-
erences to Althusser’s theories of reading and of scientific development 
when he remarks that “there is game theory in Hobbes, but in a practical 
untheorized, not made explicit state.”18 
 This reference from the late 1980s is the only positive mention 
of Althusser in Cohen’s oeuvre after 1978 and, along with the negative 
assessment of structural causality, it is one of the few that explicitly 
mentions one of Althusser’s methods or concepts. It is also the last 
gesture to Althusser or Althusserians until the series of autobiographi-
cal, methodological, and metaphilosophical reflections which began with 
the new introduction to KMTH in 2000, continued with the 2002 essay on 
“Complete Bullshit,” and that concluded with Cohen’s 2008 valedictory 
address. In each of these writings, Cohen charges Althusser or Althus-
serians with producing bullshit Marxist philosophy.19 Though some detail 
for this charge is given, it is perhaps worthwhile to take a detour into 
Cohen’s analysis of bullshit before looking at the reasons why he charges 
Althusser with its production. After we understand what Cohen means by 
bullshit and why he charges Althusserians with its manufacture, we can 
then examine FM and RC to see whether they contain bullshit and, if so, 
assay the relative amount that each contains. 
Cohen on Bullshit Philosophy
Cohen first employed the descriptor “bullshit” in order to differenti-
ate his and his associates’ methodological approach to Marxian philoso-
phy from that of other Marxist philosophers in the late 1970s.20 However, 
it was only in 2000, in a new introduction to KMTH titled “Reflections on 
Analytical Marxism,” that Cohen clarified what he meant by the term. In 
2002, and apparently now cognizant of Harry Frankfurt’s 1986 analysis of 
the phenomenon, Cohen further refined what he intended by the term and 
distinguished the variety of bullshit (philosophical) that he was interested 
in from Frankfurt’s generic analysis.21 Though the 2000 and 2002 essays 
are not consistent (one looks at the verbal form from the standpoint of its 
18  Cohen, 2014a.
19  Cohen, 2000a, 2013a, 2013b.
20  Cohen, 2013a, p. 113.
21  Cohen, 2000a; Frankfurt, 1986.
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producer, the other at the nominal form), they are complimentary; we will 
make use of both in our account of what Cohen means when he labels a 
philosophical text, argument, claim, or statement “bullshit.” This done, 
we can mark the distinctions relevant to the rest of this paper’s argument 
among bullshit Marxist philosophy, pre-analytic Marxist philosophy, and 
analytic Marxist philosophy.   
 In “Reflections on Analytical Marxism,” Cohen first takes up 
the rigorous conceptual analysis of the form of bullshit in which he is 
interested. He does so by focusing on the dialogical comportment of 
its producer, the bullshitter. This comportment, Cohen maintains, is “a 
product of an intellectually dishonest posture, one, more particularly, that 
includes an unwillingness to respond in an honest way to criticism.”22 Un-
like the dogmatist who “maintains his belief in the face of all criticism” 
and who may be honest about his unwillingness or inability to consider 
counter-arguments to his position, Cohen specifies that a bullshit-
ter is one  “who may be ready to change his position under critical as-
sault.” However, when he does so, “he does not take precise measure 
of the force of that assault in order to alter his position in a controlled 
and scientifically indicated way. He simply shifts to another unthought-
through and/or obscure position.”23 Therefore, a bullshitter is one who 
engages in a philosophical conversation and who provides reasons for 
her positions. However, when she is presented with possibly valid coun-
ter-arguments, she does not consider them according to agreed upon 
norms of philosophical reasoning and she does not take into account the 
scientific knowledge relevant to understanding the issue at hand.24 In-
stead, the bullshitter shifts the line of argumentation “in order to remain 
undefeated.”25 In short, the failings which Cohen accuses the bullshit-
ter of are ethical and epistemic: she is interested not in generating truth 
through philosophical exchange but in winning the conversation. Further, 
she is willing to achieve this rhetorical victory by dishonest means. 
 In the 2002 essay “Complete Bullshit,” Cohen further refines his 
conception of bullshit and separates the phenomenon from the inten-
22  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxvi.
23  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxvi.
24  Based on what Cohen says about science in the 2000 Introduction and in KMTH as a whole, 
this is the most charitable reading we can give to this sentence, which seems to conflate scientific 
knowledge and philosophical virtues. 
25  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxvi.
tional state of its producer. In so doing, he offers an analysis of bullshit 
which does not depend on a speaker or author’s awareness that she or 
he is unconcerned with truth and flouting philosophical virtues of clar-
ity and rigor by “aiming at obscurity.”26 Cohen is motivated to offer this 
refinement in order to better capture the variety of bullshit that he is 
interested in: philosophical. He also does so in order to contradistinguish 
this phenomenon from Harry Frankfurt’s more generic variety of bullshit 
where the speaker’s conscious indifference to truth is a necessary ele-
ment to its production.27 For Cohen, this indifference is neither a sufficient 
nor a necessary criterion for bullshit. Instead, he locates the “insufficient 
concern with truth” which is an essential feature of bullshit “with respect 
to features of the text itself.”28 
 In order to be bullshit, Cohen further specifies, a statement must 
meet at least one of the following sufficient criteria: it must be (a) un-
clarifiably unclear, (b) rubbish, or (c) irretrievably speculative. Cohen 
focuses on the elaboration of the first criterion because he believes it to 
be a feature of 20th Century French philosophical writing in general and of 
Althusserian philosophy in particular.29 In order to apply these evaluative 
tools to the statements constituting FM and RC, it is therefore important 
to cover what he means by this term, the types of unclarifiability Cohen 
enumerates, as well as the test for unclarity he specifies. Because of the 
ascription of clarity concerns to Althusserian philosophy, we will analyze 
this criterion in some depth before proceeding to the two other sufficient 
indicators of bullshit. 
 To begin with the clarity benchmark, Cohen maintains that one 
thing which will allow us to recognize a statement as bullshit is if it mani-
fests an “unclarifiable unclarity.” Such nonsensical utterances “cannot 
be rendered unobscure” and any charitable attempt at reconstructing 
them such that that they are sensical will leave a statement that “isn’t 
recognizable as a version of what was said.”30 Cohen further enumerates 
three types of unclarifiability and suggests that there may be others. The 
first type of unclarifiability is at the level of an individual sentence. The 
second has to do with the relation of a perhaps perfectly clear individual 
26  Cohen, 2013a, p. 126.
27  Cohen, 2013a, p. 115.
28  Cohen, 2013a, p. 123.
29  Cohen, 2013a, pp. 112, 126–27.
30  Cohen, 2013a, p. 122.
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sentence to the other statements written or “uttered in a given context.” 
It is important to note that, in this case, the actual interpretive judgment 
of a statement is, to Cohen, irrelevant.31 It may be a fact that an audi-
ence judges a statement to relate clearly to other parts of the speakers 
discourse when they hear it. However, these people may be incorrect and 
what matters is whether the statement in context is “graspable” when 
subjected to the test that Cohen proposes. The third type of unclarifi-
ability has to do with the relation between two statements where one is 
“taken to lend credence to another” but where the way in which this is 
accomplished is unclear and cannot be clarified. 32 We will label instances 
of this first type of unclarifiable unclarity “sentential” while those of the 
second type we will label “contextual.” Those of the third type we will 
label “credential.” Though Cohen does not note this fact, it appears that 
a credential liaison is merely a specific variety of contextual unclarifiable 
unclarity (which always has to do with the relation between two sentenc-
es) and properly does not constitute its own type. 
 If the unclarifiable unclarity of a statement is not immediately 
evident, one test for obscurity that Cohen gives is that when one adds or 
subtracts “a negation sign from a text [it] makes no difference to its level 
of plausibility.” This is also a test for “graspability” because it cannot be 
said that a statement has been grasped “if its putative grasper would 
react no differently to its negation from how he reacts to the original 
statement.”33 In addition to the “sufficient condition of clarity” test, an-
other explicit lucidity criterion Cohen mentions is that a text or statement 
must be univocal in its possible interpretations rather than generative 
of multiple meanings. Though a text or statement may, by these assess-
ments, be proven unclarifiable, Cohen does not mean to imply that a text 
with obscure elements or unclear relationships between statements must 
also be without value. Indeed, such unclarity may be productive of a “sug-
gestiveness” which “can stimulate thought” and that “tolerates a mul-
tiplicity of interpretations.”34 Labeling this type of writing “good poetry,” 
Cohen exempts it from the category of bullshit philosophy.35 
 In addition to unclarifiable unclarity, the two other sufficient 
31  Cohen, 2013a, p. 123.
32  Cohen, 2013a, pp. 122–23.
33  Cohen, 2013a, p. 123.
34  Cohen, 2013a, pp. 123–24.
35  Cohen, 2013a, p. 124.
conditions of bullshit are that a statement or text be rubbish or that it be 
“irretrievably speculative.” Unlike the sufficient condition of clarity, which 
has to do with whether a statement is univocal, graspable, or makes 
sense in relation to the other statements it informs or draws upon, an 
argument or statement is rubbish if it is “grossly deficient either in logic 
or in sensitivity to empirical evidence.”  Presumably, the statements of 
Oklahoma senators about snowballs and global warning fit this category, 
as do arguments and statements that violate the principle of identity such 
as Rimbaud’s famous line:  “Je est un autre.”  Cohen uses an example 
from David Miller to illustrate a comment that is neither unclear nor il-
logical but that is irretrievably speculative (and therefore bullshit): “Of 
course, everyone spends much more time thinking about sex now than 
people did a hundred years ago”36 We can also slightly modify Cohen’s 
rhetorical question from his 2008 valedictory address so that it provides 
another example of an irretrievably speculative statement: “If I had gone 
to Paris, I would have sunk into a sea of bullshit and become a bullshitter 
myself.”37 What both the Miller and the modified Cohen remark provide 
are examples of statements which, though clear and logically correct, are 
ones for which we could never acquire the empirical evidence to justify. 
Bullshit Philosophy, Pre-analytic Marxist Philosophy, 
and Analytic Marxist Philosophy
 Now that we have defined “bullshit philosophy” and now that we 
have tests which will allow this type of philosophy to be identified when 
applied to FM and RC, we can move onto defining and to marking the 
distinctions among bullshit Marxist philosophy, pre-analytic Marxist phi-
losophy, and analytic Marxist philosophy. Though Cohen does not give an 
explicit definition of what makes a philosophy Marxist, he does mention 
Althusser, Goldmann, Lukács, Lenin, Marx, Engels, Luxemburg, Plekha-
nov, and E.P. Thompson as Marxist philosophers. Despite being a diverse 
list, the feature that all of these philosophers and their philosophies have 
in common is that each identifies as a Marxist thinker and each makes 
use of philosophical ideas originated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. 
Therefore, following Cohen’s practice and in the spirit of his indication 
36  Cohen, 2013a, p. 123.
37  Cohen, 2013b, p. 198. The unmodified quote is: “If I had gone to Paris, would I have sunk into 
a sea of bullshit, and become a bullshitter myself? We shall probably never know.”
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from the introduction to KMTH that what he has to say about Marxism 
can be found in section 6 of the book where he talks about Marxists, we 
will call “Marxist” any philosophy which labels itself Marxist and that 
originates or develops recognizably Marxian philosophical ideas. 38 Like 
Cohen, and despite Marx’s (possibly apocryphal) protest, we will include 
Marx’s own work in the category of Marxian philosophy.39 
 If Marxist philosophy is defined as any philosophy which labels 
itself Marxist and that originates or develops recognizably Marxian philo-
sophical ideas, then how does one go about separating this great body of 
philosophical work into bullshit, pre-analytic, and analytic varieties? The 
qualitative assessments detailed above may be sufficient to allow us to 
distinguish bullshit from non-bullshit Marxist philosophy, but what allows 
us to separate pre-analytic from analytic philosophy? As with his defini-
tion of bullshit, Cohen becomes increasingly clear over time about the 
difference between the two types of philosophy, eventually offering both 
methodological and temporal considerations useful to making this dis-
tinction. Rather than give a genealogical account of this development, we 
will begin with the mature definition formulated by Cohen in the “Reflec-
tions on Analytical Marxism” from 2000.40
 In this essay, Cohen claims broadly that a commitment to analytic 
Marxist philosophy “…reflects nothing less than a commitment to reason 
itself. It is a refusal to relax the demand for clear statement and rigorous 
argument.”41 This commitment, he further explains, demands the adop-
tion of methodological individualism, or the belief that social phenomena 
must be understood as causally produced by the actions of individu-
als.42 As Cohen writes, “insofar as analytical Marxists are analytical in 
this…sense, they reject the point of view in which social formations and 
classes are depicted as entities obeying laws of behavior that are not a 
function of the behaviours of their constituent individuals.” The reason 
that Cohen gives for rejecting this perspective is that it is “scientifically 
undeveloped.” Elaborating on this point, Cohen compares Marxist expla-
nation that employs a holistic methodology to thermal dynamics before 
the application of statistical mechanics. Just it is scientifically preferable 
38  Cohen, 2000b, pp. xvii, 150–70.
39  Frederick Engels, 1882.
40  Wolff, 2014, p. 343.
41  Cohen, 2000a, p. xvii.
42  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxviii.
in thermodynamics to explain large arrangements of matter and energy by 
the movements of individual atoms so to, he states, is it better to explain 
the necessary breakdown of capitalist arrangements by the actions of its 
individual participants.43 Thermal dynamics has moved on to the expla-
nation of heat and temperature as causally produced by the actions of 
atomic individuals. Therefore, in order to be scientific, Marxism must too. 
If it does not, it is not scientific and it is not analytic.
 To be analytic also demands the use of certain techniques and the 
exclusion of others.44 There are three sets of techniques Cohen mentions 
that “require and facilitate precision of statement on the one hand and 
rigour of argument on the other.”45 The first are the “techniques of logical 
and linguistic analysis developed within twentieth-century positivist and 
post-positivist philosophy, initially in the German-speaking but then…
dominantly in the English-speaking world.” In short, one way Cohen iden-
tifies analytic philosophy is by its attempt to clarify the meanings of and 
relation between statements of positive fact and by its logical formaliza-
tion of ordinary language statements.46 The second set of techniques he 
references is that of classical economic theory, especially as these pro-
cedures have been mathematically formalized in the twentieth century. 
Finally, analytic Marxist philosophy can be identified by its use of rational 
choice and game theoretical techniques.47
 Reading through the list of techniques employed by AMP and not-
ing the methodological perspective that it employs, we may note a ten-
sion between analytical Marxism’s basic methodological assumption and 
that of many Marxists, who have historically employed holistic methods 
to explain social phenomena.48 We might also note that the background 
assumptions of logical empiricism, of classical economics, and of rational 
choice theory contradict many of the suppositions often thought basic 
to Marxist analysis.49 These include assumptions about the inability of 
formal logic to describe social phenomena, about how masses rather than 
43  Cohen, 2000a, pp. xviii–xxiv.
44  Cohen, 2000a, p. xxiii.
45  Cohen, 2000a, p. xviii.
46  Beaney, 2015.
47  Cohen, 2000a, p. xviii.
48  Shiell, 1987, p. 235.
49  Roberts, 1996, p. 14.
154 155Is There Less Bullshit in For Marx then in Reading Capital? Is There Less Bullshit in For Marx then in Reading Capital?
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 2 /
Issue 2
C
R 
I 
S 
I 
S
& 
C
R
I
T
I
Q
U
E
/
Volume 2 /
Issue 2
individuals make history, about the ideological status of current scientific 
knowledge, and about how profit is realized.50 In short, analytic Marxism 
demands that Marxists give up most of the critical, dialectical, and phe-
nomenological tools and explanations historically thought to be constitu-
tive of its theory. 
 With this necessary detour into the definitions of and distinctions 
among analytic Marxism, pre-analytic Marxism, and bullshit Marxism, we 
are now in a position to examine Cohen’s references to Althusser and to 
Althusserians in order to better understand why he identified some por-
tion of Althusser’s work as bullshit. We are also in a position to compare 
the bullshit quotient of FM and RC and to discover whether some parts of 
each book are pre-analytic or perhaps even analytic.
I am not going to do it though.
Why am I not going to do it?
 First, I will not do so because I think that it is a fool’s errand; I am 
simply not interested in analyzing every statement and the relations be-
tween each statement in FM & RC. I suspect that some individual claims 
will be unclarifiably unclear and that the relations among statements 
will not be as tight as Cohen’s tests’ demand. I also know that Althusser 
in the early 1960s was wont to make speculative statements about the 
privilege of Marxist theory in the Marxist movement and about that move-
ment’s future.51 This is so even if Althusser’s rubbish quotient between 
1960 and 1965 was fairly low. His philosophical writings from this time 
exhibit few logical howlers and they demonstrate sensitivity to empirical 
evidence, especially when compared to contemporaneous work in Marxist 
philosophy. In short, though they may not contain a lot of rubbish, one can 
probably identify portions of both RC and FM as bullshit according to Co-
hen’s criteria inasmuch as both exhibit speculative content and unclarifi-
able unclarity.52
 Second, I will not compare the bullshit quotient of FM and RC be-
cause I do not think that Althusser’s occasional lack of clarity or specula-
tive flight is a fatal flaw that renders his philosophy bullshit. To demand 
50  Mamo, 1981; Mulkay, 1992, pp. 5–26; Murray, 2000; Novack, 1969, p. 42.
51  Althusser, 1990; Düttmann, 2007
52  I also suspect that, rigorously applied, one could do the same thing with Cohens work on Marx-
ist philosophy. 
this of RC is itself a philosophical error: it demonstrates a failure to read 
the book well. As Althusser makes clear, RC was never meant to be taken 
as the painstaking analysis of the truth-value of a claim or claim in Marx’s 
philosophy (as was the intent of KMTH). Instead, RC was presented as 
a preliminary attempt at using Marx’s theory of symptomatic reading to 
read Capital itself and in order to develop the latent philosophy within it.53 
Though philosophical structures and scientific concepts were brought 
forth and developed in the book, RC is primarily a synthetic and investi-
gative work, not an analysis of each concept enumerated therein for its 
truth-value. 
 Further, the methods and the concepts Althusser and his co-
authors developed in the course of the seminar (and whose contents 
became the collective volume RC) were presented as sketchy and hast-
ily rendered; they were explicitly not meant to be taken as “contents in 
the systematic framework of a single discourse.” As Althusser wrote on 
page one of the book, its essays “bear the mark of these circumstances: 
not only in their construction, their rhythm, their didactic or oral style, but 
also and above all in their discrepancies, the repetitions, hesitations and 
uncertain steps in their investigations.54 Given this statement of intent 
and the recognition of the work’s preliminary, lacunary and, indeed, oral 
character, it seems a bit much for Cohen to require of RC that it meet the 
standard of a “refusal to relax the demand for clear statement and rigor-
ous argument,” which he sometimes set for his own work. 
  Third, I will not comb through FM and RC to see which has more 
bullshit because I do not believe that, fundamentally, the concepts and 
methods that Althusser developed in these texts are unclarifiably unclear. 
Though offering a thorough defense of this claim is not one of the purpos-
es of this paper, the history of these ideas’ reception should at least be 
sufficient to suggest that they are not bullshit. For fifty years, Althusser’s 
readers and critics have been critiquing, revising, and working with the 
concepts and methods he developed in FM and RC. Though their first 
formulation may have been hasty and less than explicit, today we have 
very lucid explanations of such concepts as structural causality, ideologi-
cal interpellation, and of Althusser’s hermeneutic method.55 This explica-
tion has been done so well that even some of Cohen’s anti-Althusserian 
53  Solomon, 2012.
54  Althusser & Balibar, 1970, p. 13.
55  Boer, 2007; Montag, 2003; Resch, 1992, pp. 50–51.
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allies are able to succinctly describe these concepts and their relations.56 
Further, theorists and activists in fields as diverse as political science, 
economics, and literature have judged these theories to have theoreti-
cal value and have put them to use in order to better understand and to 
explain the social, economic, psychological, and historical phenomena in 
which they are interested.
 
Finally, I am not going to examine every statement and the relations 
between each statement in FM and RC for their unclarifiable unclarity 
because what really interests me is why Cohen strenuously maintained for 
30 years that Althusser’s Marxism is bullshit. One way of approaching this 
question is to ask: “If many Marxist activists and thinkers find Althusser’s 
interpretation of Marxist philosophy meaningful, useful, and manifestly 
concerned with philosophical truth, then why does Cohen never engage 
with Althusser’s actual philosophy and instead label it BS?”57 Two explana-
tory strategies that could be used to answer this question are the intellec-
tual-historical and the biographical. No doubt, an account which looked 
at the unique circumstances of British Marxism of the ‘60s and ‘70s, at the 
low status of Marxist philosophy (and of political philosophy in general) 
at the time, and at the relative prestige held by Anglo-American ana-
lytic philosophical techniques at Oxford (as well as at the corresponding 
disdain for francophone methods) would go some way to explaining why 
Cohen’s might label Althusser’s Marxist philosophy bullshit. It might also 
explain why he could get away with such pejorative attributions and still 
be respected as a scholar.58 Similarly, a biographical account emphasizing 
what it must have been like for a Jewish, red diaper baby, Montrealer to 
fit in at Oxford among “tough” bourgeois analytic philosophers could go 
a long way to explaining Cohen’s hostility towards French philosophy and 
towards Althusserians.59 However, neither the intellectual-historical nor 
the biographical approach gives sufficient reason for explaining the vehe-
mence and longevity of Cohen’s thirty-year negative comportment towards 
Althusser and Althusserians. Instead, I’d like to suggest another explana-
tion, one that gives sufficient motivation for Cohen’s sustained rejection 
of Althusser and Althusserians. This explanation is a philosophical one. 
56  Rosen, n.d., p. 7.
57  Closest he comes is Balibar quote but he bungles its analysis
58  Lock, 1988, pp. 500–04.
59  Cohen, 2013b, pp. 193–97.
Why Cohen labeled Althusser’s Marxism Bullshit for
 Thirty Years
 The philosophical reasons that Cohen had for his prolonged 
rejection of Althusser can be divided into two categories. The first is the 
pronounced similarity of their two projects and the consequent need for 
Cohen to deny theses similarities in order to make his project seem more 
original, more tough, and less “French.” The second and more profound 
reason is that the results of Althusser’s projects from the early 1960s con-
tradicted and undermined some of the fundamental assumptions of the 
theory of history that Cohen developed in the late 1970s.  
 The initial similarity between the projects of Cohen and Althusser 
has already been remarked upon in this paper. Cohen himself identified 
this connection and cited Althusser as its inspiration: it is the denial 
of the importance of Hegel’s influence on Marx’s mature philosophy.60 
Though Cohen does not develop this point in the thoroughgoing way that 
Althusser does in FM, this denial of Hegel’s influence leads both to a re-
jection of dialectical materialism (or Marx’s philosophy) as it had thereto-
fore been historically conceived. This conviction would have consequenc-
es for each thinker’s conception of nature, of history, and of individual and 
social experience. In terms of a philosophy of nature, for instance, both 
philosophers challenged the idea accepted widely among Marxists that 
nature develops according to dialectical laws and that its processes can 
only be described according to dialectical logic.61 Cohen and Althusser 
also dismissed the idea propagated during the first years of the Cold War 
that dialectical materialism can serve as a guide to scientific discovery.62 
In addition, both argued against the prevalent understanding which had 
it that dialectical materialism includes a robust philosophy of history or 
philosophical anthropology. Correspondingly, neither Cohen nor Althuss-
er believed that dialectical materialist philosophy includes a formula for 
revolution or an explanation for all and every historical change. Further, 
inasmuch as dialectical materialism was often thought to include or to 
begin from a phenomenological description of the way in which individual 
subjects must experience the world, both thinkers rejected this supposi-
tion. Finally, and to summarize, neither Althusser nor Cohen believed that 
60  Cohen, 2000a, p. x, 2014b, p. 318; Wolff, 2014, p. 346.
61  Friedrich Engels, Dutt, & Haldane, 1940; Politzer, 1976; Stalin, 1949.
62  Althusser & Balibar, 1970, pp. 50–51; Cohen, 2014b, p. 318.
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there is a specific Marxist methodology, a specific way of understanding 
the world and its historical and natural processes, which flows from the 
Hegelian dialectic even if this dialectic be specified as materialist.63
 The second commonality between Althusser’s and Cohen’s Marx-
ist philosophy is that both emphasized and wished to philosophically 
defend the scientificity of historical materialism. This defense began with 
the shared belief that historical materialism was underdeveloped as a sci-
ence and that this underdevelopment prevented it from producing knowl-
edge about how our socio-economic system works.64 Consistent with the 
shared stances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, both Cohen and 
Althusser argued that one of the principal reasons for this underdevelop-
ment was historical materialism’s reliance for its fundamental concep-
tions and for its methodology on the Hegelian inspired philosophy of dia-
lectics. Instead of relying on these widely-held assumptions, both Cohen 
and Althusser argued that the “basic concepts in any theoretical structure 
must be systematically questioned and clarified.” 65 For Cohen, this interro-
gation was best done using “rigorous argument” and “precision of state-
ment” while, for Althusser in FM and RC, it was best done by a process of 
reading Marx that ferreted out and then developed the scientific concepts 
and philosophical structure latent in his mature philosophy.66
 In addition to interrogating historical materialism’s basic con-
cepts using philosophical tools and to rejecting or, in Althusser’s case, to 
severely modifying the inherited Marxist philosophy of dialectical mate-
rialism, both Marxist thinkers wished to bring the best social scientific 
methods and discoveries of their day to help develop historical material-
ism as a science. For Cohen, as we have seen, this meant an endorsement 
of individualistic accounts for all social phenomena, the specification 
of covering laws as the gold standard for scientific explanation, and the 
embrace of neo-classical economic and game theory.67 For Althusser, 
it meant employing the psychoanalytic methods of Jacques Lacan, the 
sociological insights of Claude Levi-Strauss, the historical methods of 
Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, and the historical materialist 
concepts developed in the course of Marxist practice in order to iden-
63  Althusser, 1969a; Tarrit, n.d., pp. 5, 11–12.
64  Althusser, 1969b, p. 14; Cohen, 2000a, p. xxvii.
65  Tarrit, n.d., p. 7.
66  Althusser, 1969b, p. 9; Montag, 1998, p. 71.
67  Cohen, 2000b, pp. 259–61)
tify and develop the latent philosophy hidden within Capital and other of 
Marx’s mature works.68 
 However, and this is the central and most significant difference 
between the two philosophers, the one that explains why Cohen avoided 
engaging with Althusser’s work and instead chose to label it “bullshit.” It 
is that Althusser does not take it for granted that the dominant social sci-
ence of his day (as well as assumptions about atomic level description in 
general) must fully and totally inform the contents, concepts, and meth-
ods of historical materialism. Rather, Althusser attempts to demonstrate 
that the insights from the social scientists listed above and from Marxist 
practice about the nature of social, psychological, and historical relations 
are helpful in developing the latent concepts and methods in Marx’s writ-
ing. Once such concepts as overdetermination, structural causality, ideol-
ogy, productive practices are identified and subsequently clarified using 
philosophical tools, Althusser’s belief is that they can be employed as 
the fundamental concepts of historical materialism. This accomplished, 
Marxist social science can then refine these concepts in the course of its 
empirical investigations. If the concepts identified are the correct ones 
and if they are well-employed, then historical materialism will be able to 
advance its knowledge of history and of socio-economic relations.69 
 In the words of David Macey, Althusser thinks with “borrowed 
concepts.”70 However, instead of borrowing these concepts wholesale 
from the social scientific assumptions dominant in his theoretical “habi-
tus” and assuming that they are true or productive of truth, Althusser bor-
rows analytic tools from Lacan, Lévi-Strauss, Canguilhem, Spinoza and 
others in order to discover, name, and analyze the philosophical struc-
tures and scientific concepts which allow Marx to pursue his analyses in 
his mature work. The structures and scientific concepts that Althusser 
describes and clarifies in FM and RC are discovered in Marx’s own writ-
ing and are therefore proper to his philosophy. To summarize, by a process 
of analysis, Althusser in RC and FM does explicitly foundational philo-
sophical work on historical materialism, exploring what philosophical 
structures and scientific concepts constitute its theory.
 Though Cohen equally borrows his concepts, he does not do so to 
clarify Marx’s philosophy. Instead, KMTH is a work of applied philosophy. 
68  Althusser & Balibar, 1970, p. 16, ; Peden, 2014, pp. 167–69.
69  Althusser & Balibar, 1970, pp. 183–87.
70  Macey, 1994.
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The philosophies that Cohen borrows and applies to Marxism are neo-
positivism and methodological individualism. In KMTH, Cohen begins 
with a “scientific” claim from Marx’s 1859 “Preface” to A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy and examines it using the methodologi-
cal criteria already developed within theses two philosophies. To do so, 
he must treat Marx as the author of a fully-formed, explicitly scientific 
hypothesis about how and why socio-economic systems transform them-
selves over time.71 That the claim Cohen begins with is an abbreviated 
claim, one which leaves out Marx’s statements about the power of ideol-
ogy and about the necessity to begin an analysis of history by looking 
at social relations (rather than at individual agents), does not bother 
Cohen. This is because he (a) believes that these parts of Marx’s expla-
nation of historical change are obscure or; (b) because they contradict 
the concepts and methods that Cohen knows he must use if he wants to 
do analytic philosophy.72 To be scientific according to the philosophies of 
science and social science to which he subscribes, Cohen knows that he 
must proceed via unambiguously clear statements and arguments to the 
individualistic explanations of social phenomena that are the necessary 
condition of all genuine scientific knowing. If this way of reasoning suf-
fices to explain how and why socio-economic systems must perish and be 
transformed, then Marx is vindicated in his scientific predictions. If they 
do not, then Marx’s scientific claim is false and his thesis about history 
must be rejected.73  
 If Althusser had ever been sufficiently motivated to respond to 
Cohen and to critically examine KMTH, he might have noted how KMTH’s 
central thesis relies on an idea of science in which a subject comes to 
know what its object (in this case, history) really and truly is by means 
of a process of abstraction and observation. He therefore would have 
charged KMTH with “empiricism” and probably even with its most his-
torically pernicious variant: “economism,” where the true object of knowl-
71  The claim is that “in the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations 
that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal 
and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.” Cohen, 
2000b, p. 28.
72  Cohen, 2000b, pp. xviii, 44–47, 147–50.
73  When he was unable to prove the theory of history that he attributed to Marx according 
to the standards of evidence and argumentation that he endorsed, it is to Cohen’s great credit that 
he dropped the theory and sought another justification for his Marxism. (Cohen, 2000a, p. xxiv; Wolff, 
2014, p. 348.
edge is understood to be the economy: the reality that underlies, causes, 
and can explain all historic structures and historical transformations.74 
Probably, Althusser would also wonder why Cohen insists on making 
individual agents rather than social classes the subject of history when 
there are so many passages in Marx, including the one from which Cohen 
abstracts his historiographical hypothesis, that indicate the contrary.75
 Lastly, Althusser would probably charge Cohen with not really do-
ing philosophy and with not really taking Marx seriously as a philosopher. 
He would point out that, instead of trying to understand Marx’s argument, 
Cohen picks and chooses among Marx’s theses, looking for one that is 
testable according to the concepts and ideas that analytic philosophy, 
individualistic sociology, and neo-classical economics judge to be true. 
Despite their similar claims about Marx’s originality and about the im-
portance of Marxist social science, Althusser might also point out that 
Cohen never takes seriously the originality of Marx’s claims about history, 
society, social explanation, and the possibility of social transformation. In 
short, and again despite his avowed claims about the importance of his-
torical materialism, Althusser would surely indicate that Cohen fails to 
explore the idea that Marx founded a new science. With these omissions 
and with the substitutions of tools from what Cohen labels “analytic 
philosophy,” Althusser would probably come to the conclusion that what 
Cohen is left with in KMTH is a telic theory of history, one which relies 
fundamentally for its explanatory power on the decisions of individual 
agents and that is of the sort which Marx wished to avoid or, at the very 
least, to complicate. 
 If Cohen, for his part, were to respond to the diagnosis of his own 
theory that Althusser never made but that is implicit in FM and RC, he 
would have had to examine the methodological and textual assumptions 
of his own project. Evidently, it was easier for him to keep calling the 
competing and much more popular Gallic research agenda “bullshit” for 
thirty years and to irretrievably speculate on “Why Bullshit Flourishes in 
France” than to ever do this work.76 
74  Althusser & Balibar, 1970, pp. 111, 138–39.
75  Resch, 1992, pp. 69–70.
76  Cohen, 2013a, pp. 126–32.
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